Thur, 24 Mar 2011
Letter to Wall Street Journal-

To the Editor:

The answer appears to be obvious why Japan’s Nuclear Safety Commission was unable to explain why it did not act last October to require repairs at Fukashima Daiichi when scientists identified the same serious common mode failure that occurred this month (“Japan Ignored Warning on Nuclear Design Flaw” (March 23). That is, they placed concern for the financial consequences on the plant owner from those needed repairs above safety.

That does not seem to be an isolated event. Last week, newspapers carried the story about how our Atomic Energy Commission also compromised safety for the industry’s bottom line. When the agency’s chief regulator was advised by his technical staff that the containment at GE’s boiling water reactors were unsafe, he replied that he agreed. But, he then determined that official policy would be to nonetheless ignore the problem:

"However, the acceptance [of these reactor systems by the regulatory system] is firmly imbedded in the conventional wisdom. Reversal of this hallowed policy, particularly at this time, could well be the end of nuclear power. It would throw into question the continued operation of licensed plants, would make unlicensable ... plants now in review, and would generally create more turmoil than I can stand thinking about."

Thirty-two years ago, according to Finding A.7 of the President’s Commission on the accident at Three Mile Island, the exact same problem that led to the near melt down in central Pennsylvania had previously occurred nine times at units, albeit fortunately, when operating at only partial power. The safety engineers at the plant manufacturer and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had identified the problem and warned of the devastating consequences the next time the problem recurred at a plant at full power, yet nothing was done because, again, economics prevailed over safety.

In addition to the tragic consequences for the people who live near reactors that experience major accidents, regulators do not seem to understand the need to consider the financial impacts on the overall economy beyond those on a single power company from low probability/high impact events. If the systemic problem of cognitive regulatory capture, which Willem Buiter pointed out to the Fed, cannot be overcome, then the significant implications that follow need to be recognized.

Peter Anderson
5749 Bittersweet Place
Madison, WI 53705